For several days special attention had to be given
the southern flank of the VII Corps sector. The
early joining of the Utah and Omaha beachheads
had acquired an added urgency as a result of the
difficulties in the V Corps area. Neither corps
had made as rapid progress as hoped. Considerable
anxiety existed, especially in the V Corps sector,
where only a precarious foothold had been won on
Omaha Beach on D Day and determined enemy resistance
prevented an early consolidation of the beachhead.
There was serious danger that the enemy would attempt
to drive a wedge into the gap between V and VII
Corps, particularly if he were allowed time to
bring up reserves. General Eisenhower, viewing
the situation on a visit to the Omaha area on 7
June, ordered a concentrated effort to close this
gap. General Bradley accordingly gave first priority
to this mission of linking the two beachheads and
issued the necessary directives to the two corps.
V Corps was ordered to thrust westward through
Isigny; VII Corps was to seize Carentan.
The latter mission fell naturally to the 101st Airborne Division, already
engaged along the southern flank of the Utah sector. In temporarily diverting
the main effort of the VII Corps, General Bradley even suggested to General
Collins that the 101st Airborne Division be reinforced should it be unable
to break through to join up with units from V Corps, and indicated his
immediate concern over the fusion of the two beachheads by specifically
assigning first priority to this mission.
St. Come-du-Mont
The 101st Airborne Division was already engaged in efforts to dislodge
the enemy from St. Come-du-Mont when these new orders were received by
the VII Corps commander. The new attack on St. Come-du-Mont was scheduled
for 0445 on 8 June. It was to be led by Colonel Sink of the 506th Parachute
Infantry and was to be made by four battalions (Map No. 15). On the right
the 1st and 2d Battalions, 506th Parachute Infantry, were to drive directly
from Beaumont to St. Come-du-Mont. In the center the 3d Battalion, 501st
Parachute Infantry, was to advance from north of les Droueries to the main
highway south of St. Come-du-Mont. On the left the 1st Battalion, 401st
Glider Infantry, was to move through Colonel Ballard's force east of les
Droueries, and as the entire attack approached St. Come-du-Mont it was
to slant off to the south and go down the highway to blow the causeway
bridge.
Preceded by effective preparatory fires on fifteen
registered targets, the attack got off to a good
start. The 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry,
cleared les Droueries and advanced rapidly southward.
As it approached the in-
ersection east of St. Come-du-Mont, it was threatened
with being pinched off by the convergence of the
506th Parachute Infantry units on the right and
the glider battalion on the left. A reorganization
was effected and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 506th
Parachute Infantry, were ordered to move to the
west and set up defensive positions on the east
of St. Come-du-Mont. The glider battalion lagged
behind on the left, while the 3d Battalion of the
501st went on and reached the Carentan highway,
just north of the Beaumont road intersection, about
midmorning.
Colonel Ewell, commanding the 3d Battalion, thought he saw signs of
the enemy's withdrawal westward from St. Come-du-Mont, and he decided to
go south along the Carentan highway to seize the causeway and the bridges.
But as his men moved onto the highway they were met by small-arms, machinegun,
and antitank fire from the buildings near the first bridge, and 88-mm.
guns in Carentan began to shell them. Since no communications with the
American artillery were available, Ewell's battalion pulled back to the
east of the highway. As it withdrew, the battalion was suddenly faced by
a German counterattack from the north. The counterattack was repulsed,
but an additional effort was needed to clear the enemy from a small hill
which dominated the highway on the west. With this hill as an anchor, the
battalion built up an east-west line facing north. From this line Colonel
Ewell's men beat back five successive German thrusts, each of which approached
within one hedgerow of the American positions.
In the middle of the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry,
was ordered by Colonel Sink to go in between Colonel Ewell and the 506th
Parachute Infantry. But by the time it had moved up, the enemy had begun
to withdraw. The two American battalions started in pursuit, but did not
regain contact, although the enemy could be seen moving south between the
railroad embankment to the west and the highway. About forty loaded wagons
were captured on the highway.
A patrol found that the enemy's withdrawal had left St. Come-du-Mont
completely clear. The 101st Division could now prepare to move south to
attack the four causeway bridges, the second of which had been blown earlier
in the afternoon by the enemy.
The Causeway Attack
By evening of 8 June, the 101st Airborne Division had occupied a defensive
arc on the southern flank of the VII Corps from Chef-du-Pont to the mouth
of the Douve. The 502d Parachute Infantry, after accomplishing its missions
in the Foucarville area, had taken positions on the right flank of the
division, from Chef-du-Pont to the vicinity of Houesville. The 327th Glider
Infantry, which had arrived by sea, relieved Colonel Johnson's and Captain
Shettle's men in the vicinity of the lock and the le Port bridges. The
506th Parachute Infantry held the center, astride the Carentan highway,
while the 501st Parachute Infantry was assembled near Vierville as division
reserve.
The plan of the 101st Division provided for
two crossings of the Douve. The left wing, starting
at 0100 on 10 June, was to cross in the vicinity
of Brevands; part of this force was to join V
Corps near the Vire River bridge southwest of
Isigny, while the main force was to drive southwest
to seize Carentan. The right wing was to cross
the causeway northwest of Carentan, bypass Carentan,
and seize Hill 30, southwest of the city. Capture
of Hill 30 would put the Americans astride the
principal German escape route from Carentan,
as movement to the south and east was hindered
by the Vire-Taute Canal and extensive swampland.
As the battle for Carentan developed, the left
and right wings of the division were coordinated
to form a ring about the town, and within this
ring a pincers closed in on the town itself.
[78]
With St. Come-du-Mont clear, the division's right
wing was ready to begin its attack across the causeway.
There were indications that Carentan was not heavily
defended. On 18 June Colonel Sink of the 506th
Parachute Infantry had outposted the first two
bridges across the causeway after the enemy's withdrawal
from St. Come-du-Mont, and on the following day
he made a reconnaissance to the outskirts of Carentan;
in the vicinity of the fourth bridge he drew fire
(Map No. 16). Airplane reconnaissance reported
that Carentan had been evacuated and also that
a big gap had been blown in the railway embankment,
thus making the causeway the only practicable approach
to Carentan. Straight and narrow, the causeway
rises some six to nine feet above the marshes and
spans the Douve and Madeleine Rivers and the two
Douve canals. Any attack would thus be canalized
and expose the infantry to fire from the front
and both flanks. On either side the marshes extend
out of rifle range. With the western bank of the
causeway falling away sharply to the water's edge,
only the more gradually sloping eastern bank offered
an opportunity to dig in.
The attack was to be carried out by the 502d Parachute Infantry. The
3d Battalion (Colonel Cole) started out shortly after midnight, 9-10 June.
But the inability of the
[79]
MAP NO. 16
[80]
engineers, working under fire, to repair Bridge
No. 2 caused the attack to be postponed. Shortly
after midnight a patrol, led by Lt. Ralph B. Gehauf,
set out to reconnoiter the road. The patrol crossed
the canal at Bridge No. 2 in a boat and proceeded
to Bridge No. 4. At this point the men were forced
to edge single file through a narrow opening left
by a heavy Belgian Gate which had been drawn almost
completely across the bridge, and
[81]
which they could budge only about eighteen inches.
When they had gone about fifty yards beyond the
bridge a mortar shell dropped near them, flares
went up, and then machine guns and more mortars
fired on them. The fire came from the front and
right front, the first indication that the Germans
were in positions on the highway and on the higher
ground directly south and west of the highway.
At about 0530 the patrol withdrew.
The battalion was then told that the attack would be launched in the
afternoon, with considerable artillery support, principally from the 65th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. self-propelled guns) and the
907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzers). Most of
the artillery fire was laid on the suspected and known enemy positions
southwest of Bridge No. 4. At noon the engineers had still not spanned
the 12-foot gap at Bridge No. 2, but Colonel Cole and three other men improvised
a footbridge with engineer planking, enabling the battalion to start crossing
in single file in the middle of the afternoon. From Carentan an 88-mm.
gun continued to interdict the causeway, but it did not stop the movement
and caused no casualties. The men moved low or crawled along the embankment.
At the end of three hours, when the point of the battalion had crossed
three of the bridges and most of the men were beyond Bridge No. 2, the
enemy opened fire from the hedgerows and a large farmhouse to the right
front. The men in the point hit the ditches. As they attempted to move
forward, an enemy machine gun behind a hedgerow only a hundred yards away
searched the ditches, and, after three men were hit, the group withdrew.
The battalion, extended in a long thin column on the road and, unable
to maneuver to either flank, was under enemy small-arms fire along its
whole length. To advance, it had to send one man at a time to rush the
Belgian Gate at Bride No. 4 and slip through the narrow opening under direct
enemy fire. The whole precarious maneuver would have been impossible without
artillery support, which worked over German positions from 1600 to 2330
and undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of enemy fire. Part of Company
G, which was leading the battalion, deployed to the left of Bridge No.
4, while the rest of the company tried to cross the bridge through the
narrow opening. Six men edged through; the seventh was hit and the company
stopped to build up a fire position. Three mortars were also brought up
and they worried over the German-held ground.
Still the battalion could not advance. Company I, exposed on the right
bank near Bridge No. 3 where men had no grass for concealment and could
not dig in, was hard hit, first by enemy rifle fire and later (at 2330)
by two planes that bombed and strafed its positions. The strafing in particular
took a heavy toll and, when it was over, 21 men and 2 officers of the company's
original 80 moved back behind Bridge No. 2. About midnight, during a lull
in the firing Company H started moving men through the gate at Bridge No.
4.
At 0400 on 11 June, Regiment ordered the 3d Battalion to continue the
attack, and in the darkness Company G and Headquarters Company followed
Company H across Bridge No. 4. The battalion deployed along both sides
of the highway. The center of the enemy's positions appeared to be a large
farmhouse, flanked by hedgerows, on the higher ground which rises out of
the marshes on the right-hand side of the road.
When the leading scouts on the right approached the farmhouse, they
were fired on by rifles, machine guns, and mortars. In an attempt to neutralize
the position, an artillery concentration was placed on the area but had
no perceptible effect. Colonel Cole then ordered a bayonet charge on the
farmhouse and called across the road to Maj. John P. Stopka, the battalion
executive officer, to have the or-
[82]
der passed along. Artillery put down smoke in a
wide arc around the objective. At 0615, as the
artillery fire was lifted, Colonel Cole blew his
whistle and led the charge. Of the 250 men who
should have followed him only 20 got up to go;
another 50 followed Major Stopka. In the confusion
and excitement, with the men widely distributed
and hugging the ground, the order had not been
passed around. Some of the men never received it;
others had only a vague idea by hearing a word
or two. In addition, parts of Company G, in the
meadow east of the road to Carentan, became involved
with enemy troops, armed with machine pistols.
The commanding officer of the company was hit by
an artillery short during the action. Most of the
men of Company G did not hear the whistle at all,
but when they saw the attack they ran after the
others, trying to catch up.
Despite the initial disorder, the men charged across a ditch into the
fire-swept field east of the farmhouse. The men, closely bunched, followed
Colonel Cole and Major Stopka, and Colonel Cole stopped several times to
get them to fan out. Two men of Company H reached the farmhouse first and
found it abandoned, but to the west on higher ground the enemy still occupied
rifle pits and machine-gun emplacements along a hedgerow running at right
angles to the road. Under the momentum of the charge the men also secured
this objective and eliminated the Germans with grenades and bayonets. The
enemy's main defense was thus broken, but he still held ground to the south
from which he continued to fire on the American positions. Colonel Cole
wished to take advantage of the enemy's disorganization and keep the attack
moving, but the 3d Battalion was in no condition to push on. All of the
men in the battalion managed to cross the causeway and assemble near the
farmhouse, but units were badly mixed and had suffered heavy casualties.
Word was therefore sent to the rear to ask the 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute
Infantry, to come up and pass through the 3d and continue the attack south
to the high ground at la Billonerie (Hill 30).
The 1st Battalion (Colonel Cassidy) was north of Bridge No. 4 when it
received Colonel Cole's message. It crossed the bridge under heavy fire
and deployed across the fields toward the house. Instead of relieving the
3d Battalion, however, it reinforced it to help secure the ground gained.
The 1st Battalion had been hard hit, especially by mortar fire, and was
as disorganized as the 3d. Colonel Cole commanded the positions on the
right from his command post in the farmhouse and Colonel Cassidy stayed
on the left; there was little consultation or communication between them.
On the right flank the defensive position was improved when a group
of men, after routing a few remaining Germans from the ridge, pursued them
down the side road which ran between the farmhouse and the ridge. These
men set up a machine gun at the crossroads and, together with others who
joined them later, engaged the Germans who had returned to take up positions
in the houses south of the crossroads. For the rest of the day they remained
there, virtually isolated, some 150 yards out ahead of the other American
positions. Another small group set up two machine guns in the corner formed
by two hedgerows behind the farmhouse; these guns could fire into the hedgerows
to the east, into the orchard, and down the road to the crossroads.
The defense, however, was not coordinated, and
in the farmhouse Colonel Cole remained apprehensive.
He did not know the situation on his flanks,
his communications were out, and he thought that
the supporting artillery was not effective. With
their backs against the river, the troops had
no rear area and hence no local reserve. The
artillery observers could not see where their
shells were landing because of the hedgerows
and had to adjust fire, in the manner of jungle
warfare, by sound. Very few of the men saw the
enemy,
[83]
who moved low behind the hedgerows; they judged
his closeness by the sound of his fire.
In the middle of the morning enemy artillery and mortar fire increased
in intensity, and the Germans began a counterattack. One of the strongest
thrusts came through the orchard and threatened to rout the Americans south
and east of the farmhouse. But machine guns south of the house broke up
the attack and the position was restored. It held throughout the morning.
Shortly before noon an unexplained lull occurred in the fighting. The
502d Parachute Infantry took advantage of this to re-form its left flank
positions. Company C moved forward from Bridge No. 4 to a cabbage patch
[84]
between the second and third hedgerows where they
could fire down along the forward hedgerow as well
as along the highway. Company A took positions
just behind Company C and extended its line across
the road.
At noon Regiment notified the battalions that the enemy had requested
a truce and ordered cease firing. It was a garbled message. The fact was
that General McAuliffe, who was directing the operation for the 101st,
was requesting this truce of the enemy. McAuliffe wanted time to clear
the lines of his own casualties. Maj. Douglas T. Davidson, regimental surgeon,
escorted by two Germans, went through the enemy lines to ask the military
commander of Carentan for a breathing space to evacuate the wounded. When
Major Davidson returned to Bridge No. 4, having been denied an interview
with the German commander, the enemy opened fire- with rifles, machine
guns, mortars, and artillery-in the most intense concentration of the day.
Colonel Cole called Regiment and asked permission to return fire. He was
ordered to wait, for Major Davidson had not yet returned to the regimental
command post with definite word of the end of the truce. But the men in
the line made their own decision and opened fire with all they had. They
were convinced, not only by having observed the movements of the enemy
during the truce, but also by the effectiveness of his renewed fire, that
he had used the interlude to strengthen his small-arms positions and to
prepare an artillery attack.
The renewed German attack strained the American positions almost to
the breaking point. The group at the crossroads on the right flank had
not received the cease fire order and had continued to fire on the Germans
whom they had observed moving about to their left. When the truce ended
and the enemy struck at the crossroads, some of the groups were forced
to give ground. One of the machine guns behind the farmhouse, by interdicting
the crossroads, helped the others to hold. The positions on the left, in
the cabbage patch and along the hedgerows, managed to hold throughout the
afternoon against repeated German attempts to come down the ditches beside
the highway and along the hedgerows. At times they came so near that the
men could hear the Germans working their bolts. The enemy gave the two
battalions no respite and no opportunity to reorganize or evacuate the
wounded. His artillery was weak, but his mortars never stopped firing.
Colonel Cole, looking out from a second-story
window in the farmhouse, expected his line to
crack. At 1830 he informed Regiment that he planned
to withdraw and asked to have covering fire and
smoke ready when the time came. He believed that
only closer and heavier artillery support would
enable him to hold out. But the radio of his
artillery liaison officer, Capt. Julian Rosemond,
had been jammed. When Captain Rosemond finally
managed to get through to the artillery command
post, the situation improved rapidly. During
most of the day only two battalions had been
firing in direct support. Now every gun in the
command was brought to bear. To be effective
it was necessary to adjust the fires very closely,
with the result that two Americans were killed.
The shells arched high over the American positions
and fell in the field directly beyond the farmhouse.
It lasted only five minutes, but when the fire
lifted the sound of German firing was receding
southward. Patrols sent out ascertained that
the enemy had fled. At about 2000 the 2d Battalion
came up to take over the now improved positions,
and the 1st and 3d Battalions withdrew. The enemy
defense barring the way to Carentan from the
north was broken, but the 502d Parachute Infantry
was too exhausted to continue the attack. It
requested relief, and the 506th Parachute Infantry
was sent in to finish the job.
1
1 Colonel Cole was awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor for his part in the Carentan attack.
Before he could receive the medal he was killed
in action in Holland, 19 September 1944.
[85]
MAP NO. 17
[86]
The Left-Wing Attack
on Carentan
During the two days of the fight across the
causeway the 101st Airborne Division's left wing
had also been pressing southward. The first mission
of the 327th Glider Infantry was to cross the
lower Douve and secure the high ground around
Brevands (Map No. 17). At 0145 on 10 June, Company
C silently crossed the river and established
a small bridgehead. The artillery and mortar
barrage which prepared for the crossing of the
rest of the regiment was so successful that all
three battalions were across by 0600, and Brevands
was occupied shortly thereafter. At noon Company
A of the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry,
2
was ordered to reconnoiter southeastward from
Brevands toward Auville-sur-le-Vey on the west
bank of the Vire River. About a mile and a half
from its destination the company encountered
a strong German force, and in a running battle
it broke the enemy line and knocked out twelve
machine guns. It then proceeded to Auville-sur-le-Vey,
where it made contact with the 29th Reconnaissance
2 The 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry,
operated as a third battalion of the 327th Glider
Infantry. In the airborne division reorganization
effected in March 1944, the 401st Glider Infantry
was split, one of its battalions being attached
to the 327th Glider Infantry of the 101st Airborne
Division and the other to the 325th Glider Infantry
of the 82d Airborne Division. The former retained
its own designation.
[87]
MAP NO. 18
Troop and Company K of the 175th
Infantry (29th Division).3 The assistant
G-3 of the 101st Airborne Division, who had accompanied
Company A, went to the 29th Division headquarters
to report the situation of the 101st, while Company
A mopped up the enemy force which it had just
broken up and which had constituted the last
obstacle separating VII and V Corps. This done,
it rejoined the 327th Glider Infantry for the
advance on Carentan.
The approach to Carentan from the east is cut by the Vire-Taute Canal.
The 327th Glider Infantry was ordered to block the eastern exits from the
city by securing the railroad bridge and the Isigny highway bridge over
the canal. Throughout the afternoon the regiment advanced rapidly, but
it was stopped at 1800 some 500 yards from the canal by enemy fire from
the houses and hedgerows on the east bank. The regiment reorganized to
gain these 500 yards. The 2d Battalion moved north of the highway on the
right, the 1st Battalion south of the highway; the 1st Battalion, 401st
Glider Infantry, was in reserve. The attack drove the enemy across the
canal and by midnight the two battalions had reached the last hedgerow
and dug into positions behind it. They could now fire into the city and
control the highway bridge, the only bridge still intact.
Both the railway bridge to the south and a footbridge
to the north near the junction of the canal and
the Douve had been blown. The footbridge, however,
could be repaired to permit troops to cross.
On the west bank, the wood bordering the Bassin
à Flot provided a
3 A slightly different version of the
joining of the two corps is given in OMAHA BEACHHEAD,
published in 1946, pp. 145-46. The account given
here is based on more complete information than
was available when OMAHA was written.
[88]
covered approach to Carentan. Col. Joseph H. Harper,
who had assumed command of the 27th Glider Infantry
that afternoon, decided to use this approach when
he was ordered to continue the advance on Carentan.
At dawn on 11 June a patrol repaired the footbridge,
and at about 1000 two companies of the 1st Battalion,
401st Glider Infantry, and Company G, 327th Glider
Infantry, crossed under German mortar fire. Company
G was to attack along the right side of the Bassin
a Flot, Company A along the left, while Company
C was to be in reserve. The 1st and 2d Battalions
were to hold their positions to the south along
the canal and support the attack by firing into
the city.
The companies advanced several hundred yards through the woods toward
Carentan, but when they were about half a mile from the city they were
pinned down by machinegun and small-arms fire from the houses on the northeastern
outskirts. American artillery was unsuccessful in checking the German fire,
and the companies remained in the woods all day, unable to advance.
At about 2000 on 11 June, Colonel Harper was called back to the regimental
command post. Here Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges (Deputy Commander, First
Army), General Taylor, General McAuliffe, and Colonel Johnson (501st Parachute
Infantry) had gathered to plan the next day's attack on Carentan. General
McAuliffe was given the command of the task force which was to make a coordinated
attack; it consisted of the 501st and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiments
and the 327th Glider Infantry. The 501st was to move from its defensive
position north of the Douve, cross the river near Brevands, where a treadway
bridge had been built, and swing southwest to join Colonel Sink's men of
the 506th near Hill 30, thus completing the division's ring around the
city. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 327th Glider Infantry, were to continue
to hold the canal. while the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, and
Company G, 327th Glider Infantry, were to press their attack into Carentan
from the northeast.
During the night of 11-12 June Carentan was set ablaze by artillery,
naval guns, 4.2-inch mortars, and several tank destroyer guns which fired
on point targets from the 327th Glider Infantry's positions along the canal.
The 1st and 2d Battalions, 506th Parachute Infantry, moved out at 0200
on 12 June. Near the farmhouse which had been Colonel Cole's command post
they left the highway and moved cross country directly south to Hill 30
(Map No. 18). Neither battalion met serious resistance; the 1st drove in
a German outpost line and occupied Hill 30, the 2d bivouacked on its right.
Colonel Sink (506th Parachute Infantry) moved his command post group over
the same route which the battalions had followed, but after leaving the
highway he missed the way and swung to the south of Hill 30, where he dug
in forward of the two battalions. At 0500, while still unaware of his own
position, Colonel Sink ordered the 2d Battalion to attack toward Carentan.
At dawn, when enemy fire made it apparent that the command post position
was isolated and surrounded, the 1st Battalion was ordered to attack south
from Hill 30 through the hamlet of la Billonerie toward the command post.
As the 1st Battalion started out it was counterattacked near la Billonerie.
It took heavy fighting through the hedgerows and houses to break through
and extricate Colonel Sink's group.
The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, had moved out astride
the main road leading into Carentan from the
southwest. It received harassing machine-gun
fire and interdictory artillery fire from the
south most of the way into town. As the battalion
entered, it met the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider
Infantry, which had already come in from the
northeast. This unit had pushed a patrol to the
edge of the town before dawn, but it still faced
the enemy rear
[89]
guard and was temporarily stopped. At 0600 it attacked
out of the wood at Bassin a Flot and drove rapidly
into the center of Carentan. The meeting with the
2d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, occurred
about 0730 after a short fight with enemy stragglers
around the railroad station.
While the inner pincers thus squeezed shut in the town, the wide envelopment
on the left intended to cut the enemy's southern escape routes was also
closing. At dawn the 501st Parachute Infantry crossed the canal south of
the 327th Glider Infantry, fought its way to Hill 30, and made contact
with the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, about half an hour after
the entry into Carentan. The double maneuver succeeded in capturing Carentan,
but the trap closed too late to catch the bulk of the German defenders,
who evidently had escaped south during the night.
Securing Carentan
With the capture of Carentan, VII Corps had
acquired the vital link for its communication
with V Corps. It now remained to solidify the
junction of the beachheads and secure the approaches
to the city by seizing additional ground to the
southwest and east. This was included as part
of the mission of the 101st Airborne Division,
as outlined the day before, and the division
set about this task immediately. The 501st and
506th Parachute Infantry Regiments were to push
out southwestward to the Prairies Marecageuses
de Gorges, while the 1st and 2d Battalions, 327th
Glider Infantry, were to secure the ground to
the east and, on General Taylor's orders, to
go beyond the railroad and seize the high ground
south of Montmartin-en-Graignes, in order to
insure the security of the intercorps boundary.
MAP NO. 19
[90]
The 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, remained
in Carentan.
Reinforced by five tank destroyers, the two
battalions of the 3 27th Glider Infantry set
out along the Isigny highway early in the afternoon
of 12 June (Map No. 18). At le Mesnil they turned
south, the 2d Battalion advancing on the right,
the 1st Battalion on the left. Shortly after
crossing the railroad they ran into strong resistance,
and at about 2100-2200 they were held up, the
2d Battalion in the vicinity of Rouxeville, the
1st in the vicinity of Lenauderie. The 2d Battalion
was unable to break through the German positions
but the 1st penetrated the enemy defenses and
contacted a force of about eighty men from the
29th Division, including Brig. Gen. Norman D.
Cota, assistant division commander, which had
been surrounded by the enemy. This force joined
the 1st Battalion to continue the attack,
[91]
which took Montmartin-en-Graignes and the high
ground to the south.
Colonel Harper in his command post to the rear
of his two battalions had lost contact with both
and had only a vague idea of their situations.
When he succeeded in reestablishing radio communication,
he ordered the 1st Battalion to withdraw to the
forest south of Lenauderie, abreast of the 2d
Battalion on the right. He did not know that
Montmartin-en- Graignes and the high ground had
been taken. He called Division to ask for armor,
but was informed that all the available armor
was needed to check a counterattack against Carentan
from the southwest.
4
On the morning of 13 June, the situation had been cleared sufficiently
to enable Colonel Harper, on General Taylor's order, to withdraw his two
battalions, under artillery cover, northward to the railroad. General Cota's
group was ordered to rejoin the 29th Division. Colonel Harper, reinforced
by the five tank destroyers, set up defenses which extended 3,000 yards
along the north side of the tracks above Montmartin-en- Graignes. He remained
here until 15 June. The German attack he had expected from Montmartin-en-Graignes
did not develop
Meanwhile, the battle for the merging of the two beachheads was being
decided near Carentan. On the afternoon of 12 June the 506th and the 501st
Parachute Infantry Regiments had started to carry out their mission of
securing the southwestern approaches to the town. The 506th on the right
moved out westward along the Carentan-Baupte road, and the 501st on the
left set out southwestward from Hill 30 along the Carentan-Periers highway.
A small enemy force attacked the 2d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry,
at noon, but the battalion repulsed this counterattack and pursued the
enemy into Douville, where it was stopped at a strongly organized position
manned by parachutists and panzer troops. The ensuing fight lasted the
rest of the day. During the night the 3d Battalion came in on the 2d's
right. The 501st Parachute Infantry met similar opposition on the Carentan-Periers
highway and at the close of the day held a line only a short distance southwest
of Hill 30.
An attack by the 506th Parachute Infantry was scheduled for the morning
of 13 June, to deepen the defensive base around Carentan. Before the attack
could get well under way a strong enemy counterattack, supported by armor,
struck along both the Carentan-Baupte and Carentan-Periers roads (Map No.
19 ). Included in the German forces were elements of the 37th and 38th
Panzer Grenadier Regiments and the 17th Tank Battalion, all from the 17th
SS-Panzer Grenadier (Goetz von Berlichgen) Division, and also remnants
of the 6th Parachute Regiment. The attack was obviously directed at the
recapture of Carentan, and it drove to within 500 yards of the edge of
the city. The 2d Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry, moved down to the
506th Parachute Infantry's right flank and helped to regain some of the
lost ground. But the attack threatened the junction of the V and VII Corps
beachheads so seriously that First Army decided to send armor to repel
it. Not until this armor arrived was the German threat eliminated and the
link between the two corps firmly secured.
At 1030 elements of Combat Command A, 2d Armored
Division, arrived in Carentan. One task force
attacked west along the Carentan-Baupte road
at 1400 and, followed by
4 0n the night of 12-13 June General
Cota reported that he had observed, from the high
ground south of Montmartin-en-Graignes, some 150
German troops reentering the town. The message
had been garbled to read "150 German tanks"
and had induced General Bradley to send Colonel
Harper armored support. When a major from General
Bradley's headquarters walked into Colonel Harper's
command post with the news that a company of medium
tanks, a company of light tanks, and a battalion
of armored infantry were on their way, Colonel
Harper in surprise called Division to say that
he would have enough strength with the armor to
push on to St. Lo, if that was desired. But General
Taylor called Corps and learned that because the
Germans were threatening Carentan from the southwest
he was to move the armor to Carentan. This armor
was part of the force which arrived in Carentan
in time to break the German attack. Colonel Harper
called for artillery and naval barrage on Montmartin-en-Graignes.
[92]
the 502d Parachute Infantry, passed through the
5066th Parachute Infantry and drove westward. Another
task force attacked along the Carentan-Periers
highway. Both task forces received close support
from the 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
The coordinated efforts of the tanks, infantry,
and artillery threw the enemy back several thousand
yards, inflicting an estimated loss of 500 men.
That night the 506th Parachute Infantry was relieved
by the 502d on the right flank and passed to division
reserve in Carentan.
On 14 June Carentan was secured and the junction
with V Corps was completed. On the 101st Division's
right flank, the 502d Parachute Infantry made
contact with elements of the 82d Airborne Division
at Baupte and, with the 501st Parachute Infantry
on its left, it secured the road which runs southeast
from Baupte to join the Carentan-Periers highway.
The 327th Glider Infantry held the railroad from
Carentan to the Vire River and had established
contact with elements of the 29th Division on
its left. Against this line enemy pressure dwindled.
The 101st Airborne Division had thus completed
its mission by extending the southern arc of
the beachhead and welding together its isolated
segments. On 15 June the 101st Division was transferred
from VII Corps to VIII Corps, which gradually
assumed responsibility for the protection of
the VII Corps' southwest flank.